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Abstract 
 
When do foreign banks have an advantage operating abroad and when not? Studying the performance 
of foreign banks in a large number of countries between 1999 and 2006, we find that this crucially 
depends on a number of factors. Specifically, foreign banks tend to perform better compared to 
domestic banks when coming from a high income country, but worse when coming from a developing 
country. Foreign banks tend to outperform domestic banks when competitiveness in the host country is 
limited. And foreign banks from source countries geographical or cultural close to the host country 
perform better than distant foreign banks. These findings show that it is important to control for 
heterogeneity among foreign banks when studying their performance and help reconcile some 
contradictory results found in the literature.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Banking has increasingly become more globalized, driven by deregulation, advances in 
communications technology and more general economic integration. As a result, academics and 
policymakers are keenly interested in the functioning of foreign banks in host countries. While many 
studies have compared the performance of foreign banks to that of domestic banks, studies have also 
found different results.1 One reason for these differences may be that whether being a foreigner is a 
liability or an asset depends on circumstances that influence a particular foreign bank’s ability to do 
business in a particular host country. However, few studies have tried to analyse the role of such 
factors. This paper attempts to shed light on some key factors.  
Foreign banks can have a number of advantages compared to domestic banks. By servicing the 
same clients active in more than one country they may achieve efficiency gains. In addition, they may 
achieve efficiency gains by spreading best-practice policies and procedures over more than one 
country. Furthermore, they might be able to diversify risk better, allowing them to undertake higher 
risk, but also higher return projects. For example, foreign banks may have the advantage of more 
diversified funding bases, including having access to external liquidity from their parent banks, which 
lowers their deposit costs. Moreover, by being larger, they may achieve other scale advantages; for 
example, they can more likely afford sophisticated risk models which gives them superior risk 
management skills. At the same time, foreign banks are likely to incur additional costs compared to 
domestic banks. They may have less information compared to local banks on how to do business in a 
foreign country, putting them at a disadvantage. Furthermore, foreign banks might be exposed to 
discrimination by host country government and customers.  And diseconomies might arise because of 
difficulties to operate and monitor from a distance. Depending on which effects are stronger, foreign 
banks may perform better or worse compared to domestic banks in their host country.  
Earlier studies focus on the US and find that foreign owned banks perform significant worse 
than domestic banks (see, among others, DeYoung and Nolle 1996, and Mahajan, Rangan and 
Zardkoohi 1996). Using data from other industrialized countries, studies find either no differences 
between the performance of foreign and domestic banks (Vander Vennet 1996; Hasan and Lozano-
Vivas 1998) or better performance by domestic banks (Sturm and Williams 2004). When studying 
foreign banks in developing countries, results vary as well. A number of studies other find, however, 
that foreign banks outperform domestic banks (Grigorian and Manole 2006; Berger, Hasan and Zhou 
2009). Others find the opposite result (Nikiel and Opiela 2002; Yildirim and Philippatos 2007). And a 
third group finds no significant difference between domestic and foreign banks (Crystal, Dages and 
Goldberg 2001; Mian 2003).    
                                               
1
 See Berger (2007) for an extensive survey of the literature. 
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 It is possible that these different results are the consequence of different sample periods and 
different econometric techniques, but this unlikely explains all differences. Indeed, several studies 
suggest that host and home country characteristics play an important role as well. Berger, DeYoung, 
Genay and Udell (2000) find that, for the five industrialized countries they study, the performance of 
foreign banks compared to their domestic counterparts to depend on the country of origin of the 
foreign bank. Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) and Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2006) 
find that foreign banks tend to have lower profits than domestic banks in developed countries, but the 
opposite is true in developing countries, suggesting that the advantages of being foreign do not offset 
the costs as much in industrialized compared to in developing countries. And, using data for 13 
(mostly developed) host countries, Miller and Parkhe (2002) find some evidence that the performance 
of a foreign bank is influenced by the competitiveness of both home and host countries.  
 In addition to home and host country characteristics, it is possible that cultural, geographical 
or institutional distance might impact the relative performance of foreign banks. Distance in the 
various dimensions between borrower and lender increases not only transaction costs, but also the 
information asymmetries a bank faces in its lending and borrowing decisions and therefore likely 
affects its profitability. Mian (2006) finds that foreign banks that are geographically close to the host 
country are better able to deal with local (soft) information. Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) find 
similar results, with foreign banks with parents in other Latin American countries more likely to lend 
to small, informational opaque Argentine firms than other foreign banks do. Correa (2008) finds that 
in industrialized countries the post-acquisition performance of cross-border banks is higher when host 
and home country share the same language but lower when they share the same legal system. And, as 
an example from capital markets on the importance of distance, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show 
that geographical proximate fund managers are better equipped to earn substantial abnormal returns in 
nearby investments.   
By examining the relative performance of foreign banks in a large group of developing 
countries over the period 1999-2006, this study systematically analyzes which factors have an 
important impact on the advantage or disadvantage of being foreign. The large number of countries in 
our database enables us to exploit the variation in host country and source country characteristics and 
the distance between the two. In addition, the panel structure of our data allows us to disentangle 
possible differences in short and long-term effects of foreign ownership. We find that the location of 
the parent bank, the competitiveness in the host country and the geographical and cultural distance 
between host and home countries are important factors explaining the relative performance of foreign 
banks.  
Our work adds to the literature in several ways. Most importantly, it extends the literature on 
the performance of foreign banks by documenting some of the factors that impact a foreign bank’s 
ability to operate in a host country. As such, it provides an explanation for some of the contradicting 
results found in the literature. Second, by studying how distance influences the performance of foreign 
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banks, our study contributes to this rapidly widening literature on the impact of distance on the 
activities and performance of financial intermediaries.  This includes studies that find evidence of the 
considerable impact of distance on international investment decisions (Buch (2003), loan rates 
(DeGryse and Ongena 2005), lending decisions (Mian 2006) and bank branching (Grosse and 
Goldberg 1991). Third, most studies focus only on one or a small group of (developed or developing) 
countries, with most notably exceptions, such as Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) and 
Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2006), whereas our results reflect evidence from a large number of 
countries. Fourth, our study considers the dynamics behind the performance of foreign banks, which 
has received limited attention in the literature, with a few notable exceptions (such as Majnoni, 
Shankar and Varheghi 2003 and Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper and Udell 2005).  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical 
predictions regarding the factors that will affect the advantages and disadvantages of being foreign and 
the resulting impact of being foreign on profitability. Section 3 introduces the data and discusses the 
empirical methodology we employ. Section 4 shows and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
 
2. Theoretical predictions 
 
If the advantages of being foreign outweigh the disadvantages, foreign banks should outperform 
domestic banks. If the opposite is the case, domestic banks should perform better than their foreign 
counterparts. As some previous studies find different results this may be because a number of factors 
influence the extent to which being foreign is an asset or a liability. The literature provides suggestions 
for several factors that could potentially have an impact.   
 
Home country characteristics  
Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) find for a number of OECD countries that on average 
domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks are but that these aggregate results mask 
considerable heterogeneity across foreign banks. Their results suggest that only some banks from a 
limited number of countries with specific favourable market or regulatory/supervisory conditions can 
outperform domestic banks in their host countries. They however do not provide an answer as to 
which home market conditions might give these banks an advantage.  
A first factor that might have a positive impact on the performance of a foreign bank is the 
overall development of the home market. For example, the fact that the labour force is highly educated 
makes it easier for a bank to adopt new risk management techniques, new financial instruments and 
new technologies (Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell 2001). Furthermore, more advanced countries 
in general will have well developed regulatory systems, including a relatively strong safety net. This 
allows banks to undertake higher risk-higher return projects including investing in another country.   
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In addition, the degree of competition in the home country might provide foreign banks with 
an advantage in their host country. As in other industries, the degree of competition in the financial 
sector can affect the efficiency of the production of services, the quality of products, and the degree of 
innovation in that sector. A bank that has learned to work in a competitive environment with 
demanding customers in its home country has learned to innovate, pursue new business segments and 
adjust to changing circumstances (Aghion and Howitt 1998). Greater competition at home can thus 
lead to more efficient operations abroad.  
    
Host country characteristics  
In some type of countries it might be easier for foreign banks to acquire market share and thus perform 
better. As Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) point out in countries where the banking 
sector is inefficient, banking practices are outmoded and credit is not allocated based on commercial 
criteria, foreign banks might be able to reap higher profits than domestic banks. In addition, the 
development of the financial sector could have an impact on the performance of a foreign bank. In a 
country where a large part of the population does not yet have access to financial services it is easier to 
gain market share and therefore likely easier to make a higher profit. In contrast, in countries with a 
well developed banking sector, both domestic and foreign participants may be sophisticated.  Even 
when foreign banks have technical advantages, they might not be enough to offset the informational 
disadvantages they face relative to domestic banks.  Furthermore, in a market that is highly 
competitive it might be more difficult for a foreign bank to outperform domestic banks operating in 
the country as profit margins are small.  
 
Distance  
Distance might also have an impact on the benefits and costs of being foreign. The theory of financial 
intermediation (Diamond 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986, Boot and Thakor 1997) builds on the notion 
that intermediaries serve to reduce transaction costs and information asymmetries. However, the 
severity of the asymmetric problem itself may be a function of distance (Hauswald and Marquez 
2006). As such, it would be harder to make profitable investments when distance is large. Results from 
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) support this idea. They find that in the mutual funds sector, where 
information is a lot less opaque and agency issues less severe compared to banking, managers still 
earn substantial abnormal returns in investments that are geographically close.  
Distance can also impact a foreign bank’s performance as it may impede the flow of 
information within the bank. In a theoretical model Stein (2002) shows that greater distance decreases 
the incentives of a bank manager to collect soft information. Mian (2006), using data for Pakistan, 
tests this theory, arguing that distance is especially large for foreign banks as loan officer and CEO 
reside in different countries. He shows that greater cultural distance makes it more costly for foreign 
banks to collect and communicate soft information. Similar Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) find that 
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foreign banks that are culturally close have less problems extending loans to opaque small Argentine 
firms than culturally distant foreign banks. These results suggest that distance can have a potentially 
strong impact on the performance of foreign banks. Especially when bank activities require local 
knowledge (like local deposit taking or lending to SMEs) it can be expected that domestic banks that 
are familiar with local customs and better equipped to find (soft) information outperform foreign 
banks.  
Finally, distance can affect the performance of a foreign bank as it may increase the cost of 
management or reduce efficiency in other ways. Berger and DeYoung (2001, 2006) find that distance 
determines the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms within bank holding companies. In 
addition, research on the barriers faced by foreign owned institutions suggests that distance and 
cultural differences deter cross-border M&As (Buch and DeLong 2004).  
In summary, theory predicts that distance between host and source country has a negative 
impact on the performance of a foreign bank compared to its domestic counterparts. Information 
availability in the host country, experience and bank activities may affect the strength with which 
distance influences performance.  
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
Basic Data Description 
We use a newly constructed database on bank ownership (see Claessens, Van Horen, Gurcanlar and 
Mercado 2008 for a complete description of the database). The database contains ownership and 
balance sheet information of banks in all developing countries over the period 1995-2006.2 The 
coverage is comprehensive, with in the latter part of the period banks included roughly accounting for 
90 percent or more of the banking system assets in each country. The database includes all currently 
and past active commercial banks that are or have been reporting to Bankscope during the sample 
period.3 For each bank, we determine the year of its establishment and, if applicable, the year it 
became inactive. We treat mergers and acquisitions carefully to avoid double counting.  
An important feature of the database is that for each year the bank is active over the period 
1995-2006 its ownership is determined. Furthermore, if a bank is foreign owned, the country of 
residence of the owner is tracked. As such the database allows us to look at the impact of home and 
host country characteristics as well as linkages between these countries on the performance of foreign 
banks. We use the definition generally applied in the literature on foreign banking (e.g., Clarke, Cull, 
                                               
2
 The databases does not include countries with less than five active banks in Bankscope.  
3
 The full database also includes saving banks, cooperatives, bank holding companies and long term credit banks, 
however to keep the banks in the database as homogeneous as possible we only use commercial banks in this 
paper. Commercial banks account for 90% of all the banks in the database.  
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Martinez Peria and Sanchez 2005; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2001) and consider a bank 
as foreign owned if 50 percent or more of its shares is owned by foreigners. To determine the home 
country of ownership, we sum the percentages of shares held by foreigners by the country of 
residence, with the country with the highest percentage of shares then considered the home country. 
Ownership is based on direct ownership, i.e., we do not consider indirect ownership. However, when 
the direct owner is an entity just established for tax purposes, we do not use the direct, but rather the 
relevant next level of ownership. 
To track ownership and changes therein we use as our primary source the information 
available in Bankscope. We complement this information, however, with information from several 
other sources, including individual banks’ websites and annual reports, parent companies websites, 
banking regulatory agency/Central Bank websites, reports on corporate governance, local stock 
exchanges, SEC’s Form F-20, and country experts. Through extensive searches we are able to obtain 
ownership information for almost 95 percent of the banks in our sample for the entire period in which 
they were active.4 Balance sheet information of the banks in the database is collected from Bankscope. 
Although the database covers almost all developing countries, for our purposes it is preferable 
to only use a subset of countries. When testing how ownership affects performance in a multi-country 
setting one has to deal with an endogeneity problem. The decision of a bank to enter a certain country 
is conditional on the state of the local market (structure and concentration of the banking system, 
general profitability, quality of regulation and supervision, the contracting environment, etc.). As such, 
a selection bias can exist with foreign banks seeking out those markets where they can operate best. 
Most of this bias, however, can be overcome by including country control variables and having a 
control group of local banks. Therefore, in order to limit the endogeneity bias, we only include 
countries that are sufficiently open for foreign entry (at least 3 foreign banks are active over the entire 
sample period) and for which there is a large enough control group of domestic banks (at least 3 
domestic banks are active over the entire sample period). These two conditions would limit our sample 
to only 33 countries. However, if we shorten the time period from 1999-2006 our subsample includes 
51 countries.5 By shortening the time period we do not lose much information as balance sheet 
information is rather scarce between 1995 and 1999. In our robustness tests we will show that our 
results are robust to different samples though. 
 Table 1 provides a list of all the countries in our sample. Even when using a sub-sample our 
database includes a wide variety of income levels. Ten countries are low income, 26 lower middle 
                                               
4
 While our coverage is good, there are data limitations. For example, some foreign shareholders are trusts that 
hold shares on behalf of investors, which may or may not be foreigners, but available data do not provide this 
information. 
5
 Zimbabwe also qualified, but as the economic situation in this country deteriorated so rapidly in the last few 
years we exclude it from the sample.  
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income and 15 countries are upper middle income countries.6 The table shows the size of the banking 
system of each country in terms of number and total assets in 1999 and 2006. In addition, it shows the 
relative importance of foreign banks in the country. Countries vary substantially in size of the financial 
system and importance of foreign banks. In 1999 the number of banks ranges from the minimum 
number of 6 in Angola to 226 in Russia. In 2006 Cameroon and Trinidad and Tobago have the 
smallest number of banks (9), while Russia is still front runner with 203 banks. The relative size of the 
banking sector and its growth over time in terms of assets should be interpreted carefully as asset 
information is not always available (especially in 1999). Based on our information, Tanzania has the 
smallest and China the largest banking sector in 1999. In 2006, Armenia has the least assets while 
China again topped all countries with a vast margin. In terms of number of banks, the relative 
importance of foreign banks ranges in 1999 from 9% (India and Serbia and Montenegro) to 81% 
(Hungary) and in 2006 from 10% (China) to 84% (Hungary and Romania). In terms of assets the 
relative importance of foreign banks ranges in 1999 from 0% (which indicates missing information, 
i.e., is fictive)  to 93% in Hungary. In 2006 the assets of foreign banks surpass 90% of total assets in 
four Eastern European countries (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary and Romania).     
 
Home and host country characteristics 
To capture the overall level of development of the home and host country we use GDP per capita 
(gdpcap). In addition, to see if it matters whether the parent bank is located in a high-income or a 
developing country we construct a dummy variable developing. This dummy is one if the foreign bank 
is from a developing country and zero if from a high income country. The division between 
developing and high income is based on the World Bank classification in 2006. To capture potential 
differences between the performance of foreign banks in low income and middle income countries we 
construct a dummy variable low which is one if the host country is a lower income country based on 
World Bank 2006 definitions. To measure financial development (findev) in the host country we use a 
simple measure often applied in the literature: M2 divided by GDP.  
Measuring competition, however, is less straightforward. As Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
point out competitiveness of an industry cannot be measured by market structure indicators or 
performance measures alone. In order to capture the degree of effective competition it is preferable to 
use a structural model. As such we use their measure of competitiveness: the H-statistic based on the 
Panzar Rosse (1987) methodology. The Panzar Rosse H-statistic is calculated per country from 
reduced-form bank revenue equations and measures the sum of the elasticities of the total revenue of 
the banks with respect to their input prices. H<0 indicates a monopoly, H=1 reflects perfect 
competition and 0<H<1 indicates monopolistic competition. As calculation is very data intensive the 
H-statistic is not time-varying and can only be calculated for a select number of countries (50 in total). 
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 As defined by the World Bank in 2006.  
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As a result, in the regressions where we examine the impact of competition in host and home country 
on the performance of foreign banks our sample will be reduced. For the exact calculation of the H-
statistics and the countries for which the statistic is available, see Claessens and Laeven (2004).   
   
Measuring Distance  
There are different ways one can measure distance. The measure most commonly used in the literature 
captures geographical or cultural distance.7 We proxy this type of distance by two dummies. Following 
Mian (2006) one of the dummies, samereg, equals one if host and source country are located in the 
same region (as defined by the World Bank).8 The other, comlang, equals one if both countries share 
the same language 
Distance can also be measured by the difference in institutional quality between host and 
home country. As banking is a highly institutionally sensitive activity, familiarity to deal with the 
institutional environment likely affects the ease with which a bank can use available information. A 
number of studies have found that institutional similarity matters in the location decisions of foreign 
banks (Galindo, Micco and Serra; Claessens and Van Horen 2008).  We create a dummy variable, 
instfam, that captures institutional distance between source and host countries. The variable is based 
on the governance indicators of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2008). The KKM-indicators 
measure six dimensions of institutional quality: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political instability 
and violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of 
corruption. For each dimension, indexes range from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating a better 
institutional environment.9 We take the simple average of these six governance indicators and then 
calculate the absolute difference between the institutional quality in host and source country. When the 
difference between host and home country is smaller than the median difference instfam has a value 
one, if it is higher it is zero. We expect the relative performance of foreign banks to be better when 
geographical and cultural or institutional distance between host and home country is small.  
 
Empirical methodology 
There are several dimensions by which to study the performance of foreign banks. We opt for a very 
straightforward one and study the impact of bank ownership on the profitability (as measured by profit 
                                               
7In general geographical distance is highly correlated with cultural difference, so we treat geographical and 
cultural distance as synonym.   
8
 The World Bank categorizes developing countries in six regions, that is Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and Northern Africa, East Asia and Pacific and 
South Asia. We employ these same regions and add one: high income-OECD countries. This leaves us with a 
group of non-developing non-OECD countries. These countries are added to one of the regions based on their 
location.  
9
 The measures are currently collected on an annual basis, but before 2002 only on a bi-annual basis. We use the 
value of the previous year for the years in which no indicator is available.  
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before taxes divided by total assets) of a bank. More specifically we use a panel model relating 
performance to bank ownership, the abovementioned interaction variables and a number of controls. 
We use country-year fixed effects to control for unobserved country characteristics that are allowed to 
vary over time. This way we can estimate whether in a given country foreign banks tend to outperform 
domestic banks. Our model thus already controls for those country characteristics that have proven to 
have explanatory power for bank performance, such as the general level of development, financial 
depth, banking market structure, the quality of information infrastructure, property rights and aspects 
of macro-economic policy of the country. Furthermore, this way we control for (country dependent) 
variation in profitability over time due to, for example, interest rate cycles and macroeconomic cycles.  
 We do, however, include a number of bank level controls. We include size of the bank 
measured by the share of the domestic banking market it captures (share). We expect larger banks in 
general to perform relatively well compared to smaller foreign banks. In addition we control for the 
loan to asset ratio (loan) and the deposit to asset ratio (deposit) to account for the fact that the average 
performance of different types of banks might vary. Furthermore, we control for the leverage of the 
bank (leverage) defined as equity divided by assets. Furthermore, we include a dummy (public) which 
is one if a domestic banks is majority owned by the government as to control for the fact that 
government owned banks tend to be relatively weak performers. Finally, we include a dummy 
variable, problembank, which is one if the bank (foreign or domestic) has exited the market within 
four years after entry.10 Banks that exit the market soon after entry are likely banks that have 
underperformed. Not correcting for this could potentially bias the estimation. Table 2 reports the 
summary statistics of all the variables employed in the empirical specifications. The Appendix Table 1 
provides a complete description of all variables used. 
To summarize, we test what factors affect the profitability of foreign banks using the 
following specification:   
ictictictictictict XFOwnOwn εγββα ++++=∏ '* 1210  (1) 
 
where ict∏ is profitability of bank i, in country c at year t. j indicates the home country of the foreign 
bank. Own is the ownership dummy, which is one if the bank is foreign owned. ictF  represents one of 
the factors (distance, home or host country characteristics) that might explain the differential impact of 
foreign ownership on profitability. ictX is a vector of bank level variables. We estimate the model 
using OLS. All standard errors are robust and allow for clustering at the country level.  We weigh the 
observations with the weights equal to the inverse of the number of banks in the host country to 
prevent any bias due to differences in market size. As in the first years after starting up a bank or 
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 For the banks that entered after 2002 we do not know whether they are “problem” banks or not. In our 
regressions we err on the side of caution and include these banks in the group of “problem” banks. However, our 
results are robust to including these banks in the group of normal banks.  
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acquiring an existing bank the profitability likely is affected by start-up costs we exclude observations 
in the first 2 years the (foreign or domestic) bank is active.  
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Individual country regression 
Before examining which factors can explain the cost of being foreign, we first look at individual 
country results. This enables us to see if indeed differences exist between countries with respect to the 
performance of foreign banks. For the individual country regressions we apply model (1) without  
country-year fixed effects but with year fixed effects  
Results are summarized in Table 3. The table divides the countries in our sample in 4 groups. 
The first group (upper left quadrant) consists of countries for which the impact of ownership is 
positive and significant. In these countries foreign banks are on average more profitable than domestic 
banks. The second group (upper right quadrant) contains countries with a positive but insignificant 
parameter for ownership. Countries in which domestic banks tend to outperform foreign banks 
(negative and significant sign for ownership) are located in the lower left quadrant. The last group 
(lower right quadrant) displays those countries for which ownership has a negative sign but is 
insignificant.  
The table indicates that in our group of 51 countries, all four cases occur. Foreign banks are 
performing better than domestic banks in 15 countries and worse in 8 countries. In the majority of 
countries there does not seem to be a significant difference between domestic and foreign banks. Of 
this group ownership has a positive sign in 13 countries and a negative sign in 15 countries.  
These results reinforce the results of previous studies: when looking at aggregate data there is 
no straightforward relationship between bank ownership and performance. Apparently under some 
conditions being a foreigner is an asset, in some cases it is a liability and sometimes ownership just 
does not matter. In the next section we investigate which factors have an impact on the relative 
performance of foreign banks.  
 
Foreignness and home and host country characteristics 
We pool all countries together and test whether the impact of foreign ownership is dependent on 
certain factors, starting with home and host country characteristics. The results are provided in Table 
4. The first column of the table shows that if we do not differentiate between different types of foreign 
banks we find no impact of foreign ownership on profitability.  
 However, as soon as we allow for heterogeneity with respect to home and host country we see 
that foreign ownership does matter. When looking at home country characteristics we find strong 
evidence that the level of development of the country in which the parent company is located 
influences the performance of foreign banks. We find a significant and positive effect when interacting 
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ownership with GDP per capita of the home country. The significance of the income effect becomes 
even stronger when we split home countries in high-income versus developing countries. We find that 
foreign banks outperform domestic banks when the parent is located in a high-income country. 
However, when the parent is located in a developing country a foreign bank performs significantly 
worse than a domestic bank. This suggests that technical and regulatory advances of foreign banks 
from high income countries make it easier for these banks to make profitable investments in 
developing countries. One could argue that these results are driven by the fact that foreign banks from 
high-income countries tend to be larger than foreign banks from developing countries and that it is 
scale not home country development that matters for the difference in profitability. However, we 
tested for this (results not shown) and find that if we control for the scale of foreign banks our results 
do not change.  
 Competition in the foreign bank’s home country does not affect the performance of the bank. 
However, competition in the host country does have an impact. We find that when competition in the 
host country is limited foreign banks are more likely to outperform domestic banks. This is not 
surprising. When competition is still limited it will be easier for a bank to generate excess returns and 
thus make a larger profit. Other host country characteristics (the level of overall and financial sector 
development) do not matter much for the relative performance of a foreign bank. 
 When we combine both significant factors (developing country foreign bank and competition 
in the host country) in one regression (last column) we find that both results keep their significance, 
suggesting that both factors matter. Looking at the economic relevance of our findings we see that 
they are important. A foreign bank from a high income country investing in the host country with 
lowest competition (Turkey) earns on average a profit before tax of 0.72 higher than a domestic 
bank.11 This is equal to 44 percent of the mean profitability. Similarly, this same bank in a country 
with strongest competition (Costa Rica) earns on average a profit before tax of 0.70 less than a 
domestic bank. A foreign bank from a developing country, on the other hand, earns on average 0.18 
less compared to a domestic bank in the host country with lowest competition and 1.60 less in the host 
country with highest competition.   
 When looking at the control variables we see that they are in almost all cases very consistent 
across the regressions. Large banks tend to be more profitable than smaller banks. Banks that have a 
larger loan ratio and banks with a larger share of deposits also tend to be more profitable. Furthermore, 
banks with limited leverage (high share of equity in assets) are on average more profitable. Domestic 
banks that are majority government owned are less profitable compared to private banks. Finally, 
banks that exited the market within the first four years after entering are on average less profitable. 
None of these results are very surprising.      
                                               
11
 The minimal level of competition in our sample of host countries is 0.46. This value times 3.107 and 
subtracted from 2.157 equals 0.72.  
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Foreignness and Distance 
When testing for the impact of distance on the performance of foreign banks it is important to control 
for the home and host country characteristics that have an important impact on foreign bank 
performance. Especially it is important to control for the level of development when using region in 
which home and host country are located as proxy for geographical and cultural distance. After all, as 
all host countries are developing countries only a very small group of foreign banks from high-income 
countries (in effect only the non-OECD high-income countries) will be located in the same region. So 
without correcting for level of development of the home country, the dummy samereg will not only 
capture the impact of being geographically close but also the impact of being from a developing 
country.  
 As is clear from the results in Table 4, also competition in the host country is an important 
factor affecting a foreign bank’s profitability. We do, however, not include this variable as a control. 
As we do not have the H-statistic for all the countries in our sample we will lose a lot of information 
(913 foreign bank-year observations) when we include this variable. We did however test whether our 
main results are sensitive to excluding this variable and this turns out not to be the case.  
 The results in Table 3 show that, after controlling for the level of income of the home country 
of the foreign bank, geographical and cultural distance does matter for performance of the foreign 
bank. Banks that are geographically and culturally close, either proxied by the home and host country 
being located in the same region or having the same language, have on average a higher profitability 
than foreign banks that are geographically and culturally distant. We check whether these results differ 
between high-income and developing country foreign banks but this is not the case (results not 
shown). Both types of foreign banks benefit significantly from being geographically and culturally 
close. Our results thus confirm the theoretical predictions.  
In the case of institutions, however, we do not find a significant impact of being familiar.12 
One explanation for this finding is that the KKM governance indictors are too general to capture 
institutional familiarity that matters for banking. In one of our extensions we will examine whether 
this story changes when more specific institutional variables are used.  
  
Summarizing, our results indicate that the relative performance of a foreign bank is affected by a 
number of factors. First, foreign banks from high income countries tend to be more profitable 
compared to domestic banks, while foreign banks from developing countries are less profitable. 
Furthermore, foreign banks entering a country where competition in the banking sector is limited are 
more profitable than foreign banks entering a country with a lot of competition. Finally, a foreign bank 
that is geographical and cultural close is more profitable than one that is distant. Our results indicate 
                                               
12
 We tested whether we found different results when using a continuous variable capturing institutional 
difference between host and home country. This was not the case.  
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that it is important to control for this heterogeneity among foreign banks when examining the relative 
performance of foreign banks.   
 
Robustness test 
We conduct a robustness test to verify that our results are not affected by the sample of countries we 
focus on in the regression. Specifically, we run the regressions on a smaller sample of 33 countries for 
which the restrictions of at least 3 foreign and 3 domestic banks active in each year hold over the full 
period for which we have data (1995-2006).  
 We find that our results are robust to this different sample (Table 6). As was the case in our 
previous sample, without controlling for foreign bank heterogeneity our data indicate that ownership 
does not have a significant impact on the performance of banks. Again we find that the level of 
development of the home country and competition in the financial sector of the host country matter for 
foreign bank performance. Geographical and cultural distance reduces the profitability of foreign 
banks, although in this sample the interaction with samereg is positive but insignificant. Institutional 
familiarity, again, does not seem to have an impact on the performance of foreign banks.  
In contrast to our previous result we do find this time that operating in a low income country 
has a positive and significant effect on the performance of a foreign bank. However, when we run a 
regression controlling for the impact of home country of the parent and competition in the host 
country, the impact of working in a low income country becomes insignificant (results not shown). All 
other omitted results are very similar to the ones found in the previous section.   
 
Extensions 
The first question one could ask is whether the time a foreign bank has been active in the host country 
has an impact on its performance. Especially, it is possible that the impact of distance is affected by 
the length of stay. Once you have operated in a country for some time you will understand the 
peculiarities of doing business in the country better. As such distance might effectively be reduced.  
 In order to test whether length of stay matters we split our sample in two groups. The first 
group (new banks) contains all the foreign and domestic banks that have been active in the country for 
12 years or less. The second group (old banks) contains all banks that have been active in the country 
more than 12 years.13 Results are shown in Table 7. We find that for new banks ownership does not 
seem to matter at all. New foreign banks (regardless their home country, competitiveness in the host 
coutnry or the distance between home and host country) do on average not perform any better or worse 
                                               
13
 Keeping the sample together is problematic for two reasons. First, the interaction between ownership and the 
factors that can impact it and the double interaction of ownership, the factors that impact it and a dummy that 
distinguishes whether the foreign bank is old or new are highly correlated. As such the results would be affected 
by mulitcollinearity. Second, using a double interaction would mean that you compare new foreign banks with 
old foreign banks and old ánd new domestic banks. However, the more logical comparison would be comparing 
new foreign banks with new domestic banks and old foreign banks with old domestic banks.    
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than new domestic banks. Although almost all parameters have the expected signs, they are all (except 
one) insignificant.  
 The difference between foreign and domestic banks is much more pronounced for the more 
established banks. We do see that when comparing old domestic and foreign banks we find the same 
results as we found for the complete sample. This result suggests that if you face a disadvantage of 
being foreign because you, for example, are from a home country that is geographically and culturally 
distant, this disadvantage does not disappear over time. We checked for different cut-offs for domestic 
and foreign banks, but results were highly consistent.  
 We also examined whether type of bank matters for relative performance of a foreign bank 
and the factors that affect it. Arguably, a bank that generates a large portion of its assets from deposit 
taking needs to rely more on local information. In this respect you would, for example, expect for 
these banks distance to matter more. However, when we tested for this by splitting the sample in two 
groups (one with domestic and foreign banks with limited deposit ratio and one with banks with high 
deposit ratio) we did not find any consistent differences between these two types of banks (results not 
shown).   
 Finally we have a closer look at the impact of institutional distance. Instead of measuring 
institutional distance using the broad KKM governance indicators, we use the more specific doing 
business indicators. One big disadvantage of these indicators is, however, that they are only available 
for the last two years of our sample. In other words, we have to assume that the difference in 
institutions between home and source has stayed the same over the sample period. With this caveat in 
mind, we test whether several dimensions of doing business matter for the relative performance of 
foreign banks. Specifically, we test for distance with respect to the cost of registering property, legal 
rights, creditor information, investor protection and the cost of enforcing contracts. Similarly to our 
instfam variable we take the absolute difference between the level of each dimension in the host and 
home country of the foreign bank. If the difference is lower than the median difference than the 
dummy representing that specific dimension is one, if the difference is higher the dummy is zero. For 
a full description of the variables see the Appendix.  
 The results in Table 8 show that even if we look at more specific dimensions of institutional 
quality, the institutional distance between home and host country does not seem to have an impact on 
the performance of foreign banks. Thus, even though geographical and cultural distance do seem to 
matter, institutional distance, surprisingly, does not.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Although the performance of banks when entering a foreign country has received ample attention in 
the literature the results found so far were far from univocal. In some cases foreign banks performed 
better compared to domestic banks while in other cases the reverse was true. This study reconciles 
these differences by showing that a number of factors importantly contribute to the relative 
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performance of a foreign bank. Using data from a large number of developing countries over the 1999-
2006 period, this study found strong evidence that the level of development in the home country, the 
competitiveness of the financial sector in the host country and the geographical and cultural distance 
between home and host country are important determinants for the profitability of a foreign bank.  
Our results suggest that when studying the behaviour of foreign banks they should not be 
looked upon as a homogeneous group. Furthermore, they indicate that banks from certain countries 
will be better equipped to operate in foreign countries, suggesting that further consolidation of the 
world’s financial sector is likely. However, with a number of emerging markets becoming more and 
more similar to high-income countries and realizing that being geographical and cultural close is a 
major asset in cross-border banking, it is expected that in the future banking groups from these 
countries will start to play an increasingly important role, especially in other developing countries. 
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Angola 6 355,579 0.50 0.00 11 7,227,363 0.55 0.51
Argentina 94 118,577,888 0.40 0.58 66 79,935,400 0.35 0.29
Armenia 10 131,979 0.40 0.35 10 937,972 0.60 0.52
Azerbaijan 22 379,626 0.18 0.00 20 3,641,726 0.15 0.04
Belarus 18 7,129,884 0.22 0.11 17 11,963,159 0.47 0.13
Bolivia 13 4,847,764 0.46 0.50 12 3,783,372 0.58 0.32
Bosnia & Herzegovina 26 847,633 0.23 0.28 27 8,753,051 0.56 0.93
Brazil 169 324,041,376 0.33 0.15 136 807,217,280 0.36 0.24
Bulgaria 25 1,539,386 0.44 0.60 25 21,330,820 0.68 0.77
Cameroon 8 1,338,541 0.38 0.66 9 3,573,703 0.56 0.73
Chile 28 64,370,800 0.54 0.20 26 114,616,544 0.42 0.31
China 48 425,009,088 0.15 0.00 68 4,183,970,560 0.10 0.00
Colombia 38 15,160,134 0.29 0.15 21 46,897,108 0.19 0.10
Costa Rica 25 859,202 0.36 0.10 16 11,344,553 0.50 0.14
Croatia 53 10,238,545 0.25 0.68 34 56,219,612 0.32 0.92
Czech Republic 31 45,115,196 0.45 0.58 21 147,019,488 0.52 0.78
Ecuador 36 1,305,500 0.19 0.01 22 11,153,300 0.23 0.04
Egypt 32 79,240,344 0.16 0.06 29 101,890,088 0.45 0.22
El Salvador 14 6,146,466 0.36 0.03 12 2,668,516 0.75 0.79
Ghana 14 924,117 0.50 0.59 15 3,434,458 0.60 0.64
Guatamala 34 3,925,982 0.21 0.09 25 8,715,088 0.24 0.04
Honduras 23 2,567,477 0.22 0.01 18 5,675,361 0.39 0.04
Hungary 31 23,782,900 0.81 0.93 25 107,399,400 0.84 0.95
India 70 109,916,192 0.09 0.06 65 822,792,704 0.11 0.06
Indonesia 96 95,940,776 0.27 0.04 67 130,600,080 0.42 0.12
Kazakhstan 22 1,533,655 0.36 0.07 22 66,570,956 0.41 0.06
Kenya 43 4,089,385 0.26 0.43 35 9,096,599 0.29 0.46
Latvia 21 1,266,426 0.29 0.69 21 28,936,032 0.43 0.60
Macedonia 14 914,747 0.21 0.02 16 3,535,409 0.44 0.57
Malaysia 42 126,841,000 0.33 0.14 34 291,326,688 0.41 0.15
Mexico 44 127,769,040 0.41 0.14 33 239,183,760 0.45 0.81
Moldova 14 73,795 0.36 0.48 14 1,611,698 0.43 0.24
Morocco 13 12,499,912 0.38 0.00 11 75,407,432 0.45 0.18
Pakistan 21 10,868,394 0.14 0.00 24 58,739,136 0.25 0.24
Paraguay 21 2,889,536 0.67 0.69 13 3,131,878 0.69 0.69
Philippines 38 5,793,662 0.18 0.00 30 85,399,536 0.17 0.01
Poland 49 14,335,412 0.63 0.55 42 162,652,944 0.71 0.85
Romania 28 13,492,174 0.46 0.37 25 55,020,840 0.84 0.92
Russia 226 16,412,585 0.12 0.19 203 297,644,544 0.18 0.24
Senegal 10 1,159,247 0.60 0.69 11 3,240,688 0.64 0.60
Serbia & Montenegro 33 10,955,451 0.09 0.02 41 16,620,306 0.63 0.75
South Africa 35 12,539,352 0.20 0.05 22 273,761,856 0.23 0.00
Tanzania 13 35,974 0.62 0.00 17 4,772,843 0.65 0.68
Thailand 16 114,330,784 0.19 0.06 16 215,523,648 0.25 0.04
Trinidad & Tobago 9 8,047,892 0.33 0.15 9 18,960,600 0.44 0.08
Tunisia 15 1,107,908 0.33 0.13 16 23,485,424 0.50 0.26
Turkey 59 74,375,096 0.15 0.03 35 378,389,632 0.37 0.12
Uganda 16 495,403 0.63 0.78 15 2,403,275 0.67 0.80
Ukraine 42 2,187,487 0.14 0.11 48 47,106,432 0.35 0.51
Uzbekistan 10 598,439 0.30 0.17 13 4,711,554 0.31 0.01
Venezuela 48 15,299,864 0.25 0.27 40 67,342,032 0.30 0.32
Table 1 
Ratio 
foreign 
assets to 
total assets
Number 
of banks
Total assets Ratio foreign 
banks to total 
banks
Country Number 
of 
banks
Total assets 
(thousand 
US$)
Ratio 
foreign 
banks to 
total banks
1999 2006
Ratio 
foreign 
assets to 
total assets
Country coverage and characteristics of banking sector
The table reports the countries included in our sample. It provides information about the size of the banking sector and the relative importance of
foreign banks in terms of numbers and assets in 1999 and 2006. A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign ownership. 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD
Bank-level 
Profitability 1.65 1.54 -24.59 14.37 3.32
Ownership 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46
Share 4.40 1.22 0.00 100.00 8.53
Loan 48.00 49.27 0.00 98.49 19.57
Leverage 16.33 11.53 0.01 100.00 14.83
Deposit 73.08 79.35 0.00 99.46 18.75
Public 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29
Problembank 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.22
Home characteristics
Gdpcap_home 26,441 29,134 690 49,451 10,196
Competition_home 0.63 0.66 0.41 0.86 0.14
Host characteristics
Gdpcap_host 7,759 7,899 639 22,004 4,362
Competition_host 0.70 0.73 0.46 0.92 0.10
Financial development_host 45.22 41.74 2.23 162.19 25.62
Distance 
Same region 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38
Common language 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.39
Institutional familiar 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
Table 2 
Summary Statistics
The table provides the summary statistics of the variables employed in the empirical specifications. The summary statistics for the
bank level variables are based on the full sample (7,923 observations). The summary statistics of the home and host characteristics
and the distance variables are based on only the foreign banks in the sample (2,540 observations for all variables except
competition_home (2281) and competition_host(1685))  A definition of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 3
Impact of foreign ownership on profitability - Individual country regressions 
Domestic better than 
foreign
Significant Insignificant 
Foreign better than 
domestic Trinidad & 
Tobago Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Serbia & 
Montenegro
The table provides an summary of the impact of foreign ownership on profitability for each country in the sample based on regression model (1).
For countries located in the upper left quadrant the ownership dummy is positive and significant. For countries in the upper right quadrant it is
positive but insignificant. For countries in the lower quadrant the ownership dummy is negative; significant for the countries in the lower left
quadrant and insignificant for countries in the lower right quadrant. 
Combined
Baseline Gdpcap
High vs 
developing
Competiti
on Gdpcap
Low vs 
middle
Competiti
on
Financial 
developm
ent
Home and 
host
Own 0.167 -0.459 0.409** 0.978 0.495 0.039 1.901* -0.191 2.157*
[0.923] [1.281] [2.025] [1.550] [1.605] [0.197] [1.864] [0.628] [1.939]
Own*gdpcap_home 0.000*
[1.923]
Own*developing -1.039*** -0.902***
[3.381] [3.196]
Own*comp_home -1.219
[1.258]
Own*gdpcap_host 0.000
[1.320]
Own*low 0.639
[1.307]
Own*comp_host -2.961* -3.107*
[1.829] [1.770]
Own*findev_host 0.571
[1.387]
Share 0.032** 0.031** 0.029** 0.031** 0.032** 0.031** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.033***
[2.577] [2.503] [2.423] [2.618] [2.582] [2.590] [3.347] [4.386] [3.407]
Loan 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009** 0.007* 0.007 0.009* 0.009** 0.008*
[1.625] [1.624] [1.489] [2.046] [1.730] [1.634] [1.970] [2.361] [1.897]
Deposit 0.010* 0.011* 0.011* 0.008* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 0.011** 0.010*
[1.794] [1.922] [1.938] [1.752] [1.896] [1.700] [1.665] [2.054] [1.757]
Leverage 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.054*** 0.035*** 0.057***
[3.483] [3.790] [3.935] [3.525] [3.583] [3.526] [5.375] [3.623] [5.695]
Public -0.374* -0.362* -0.322* -0.349* -0.348* -0.387* -0.433** -0.335* -0.422*
[1.972] [1.904] [1.750] [1.809] [1.884] [1.965] [2.080] [1.713] [2.006]
Problembank -0.595** -0.597** -0.608** -0.675** -0.602** -0.618** -1.014*** -0.552* -1.020***
[2.181] [2.147] [2.158] [2.396] [2.199] [2.272] [4.047] [1.954] [4.025]
Observations 7,923 7,923 7,923 7,609 7,923 7,923 5,479 7,658 5,479
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.16
Home characteristics Host characteristics
Impact of foreign ownership on profitability - Home and host characteristics
Table 4
The table shows how different home and host characteristics impact the performance of foreign banks in developing countries. The dependent
variable is profit before taxes divided by assets. Own is a dummy which is one if the bank is foreign owned. Gdpcap_home and gdpcap_host 
reflect gdp per capita in home and host country of the foreign bank respectively. Developing is a dummy which is one if the parent of the foreign
bank is located in a developing country. Comp_home and comp_host are the Panzar Rosse (1987) H -statistics of the home and host country of
the foreign bank respectively as calculated by Claessens and Laeven (2004). Low is a dummy which is one if the host country is a low-income
developing country. Findev_host equals M2 as a percentage of GDP in the host country. Share is the ratio of the bank's assets to total assets of
the country's banking sector. Loan captures the ratio of loans to assets of the bank. Deposits equals deposits as percentage of the bank's assets
and leverage equals equity as percentage of assets. Public is a dummy which is one if a bank is majority owned by the government.
Problembank is a dummy which is one if the foreign bank exited the market within four years after entering. The sample period is 1999-2006.
All regressions are estimated using weighted OLS where the weights are equal to the inverse of number of banks active in the country in a given
year. Regressions include a constant and country-year fixed effects. The robust t-statistics allowing for clustering at the country level appear in
brackets and ***, ** and * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance respectively.
Same region Common language Institutional familiar
Own 0.386* 0.234 0.388
[1.908] [1.144] [1.647]
Own*samereg 1.792*
[1.795]
Own*comlang 0.810***
[3.053]
Own*instfam 0.078
[0.258]
Own*developing -2.585** -1.237*** -1.089***
[2.522] [4.047] [2.786]
Share 0.029** 0.026** 0.029**
[2.390] [2.294] [2.419]
Loan 0.007 0.006 0.006
[1.530] [1.416] [1.488]
Deposit 0.010* 0.008 0.011*
[1.857] [1.567] [1.991]
Leverage 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.037***
[3.817] [3.833] [3.893]
Public -0.311* -0.325* -0.324*
[1.696] [1.881] [1.760]
Problembank -0.617** -0.560* -0.606**
[2.197] [2.006] [2.150]
Observations 7,923 7,903 7,923
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.22
Impact of foreign ownership on profitability - Distance
Table 5
The table shows how different measures of distance impact the performance of foreign banks in
developing countries. The dependent variable is profit before taxes divided by assets. Own is a
dummy which is one if the bank is foreign owned. Samereg is a dummy which is one if home and
host country are located in the same region. Comlang is dummy which is one if home and host
country share the same language. Instfam is a dummy which is one if home and host country are
institutionally similar. Developing is a dummy which is one of the parent if the foreign bank is
located in a developing country. Share is the ratio of the bank's assets to total assets of the country's
banking sector. Loan captures the ratio of loans to assets of the bank. Deposits equals deposits as
percentage of the bank's assets and leverage equals equity as percentage of assets. Public is a dummy
which is one if a bank is majority owned by the government. Problembank is a dummy which is one
if the foreign bank exited the market within four years after entering. The sample period is 1999-
2006. All regressions are estimated using weighted OLS where the weights are equal to the inverse of
number of banks active in the country in a given year. Regressions include a constant and country-
year fixed effects. The robust t-statistics allowing for clustering at the country level appear in brackets
and ***, ** and * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance respectively.
Baseline
High vs 
developing
Competition 
host Combined Same region
Common 
language
Institutional 
familiar
Own 0.234 0.432* 2.424** 3.073*** 0.425* 0.276 0.562*
[1.166] [2.001] [2.715] [3.020] [1.964] [1.272] [1.837]
Own*developing -0.876*** -1.105*** -1.493 -1.039*** -0.564**
[3.185] [4.611] [1.310] [3.886] [2.259]
Own*comp_host -3.448** -4.100**
[2.533] [2.639]
Own*samereg 0.727
[0.652]
Own*comlang 0.736**
[2.242]
Own*instfam -0.359
[1.141]
Share 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.041***
[3.181] [3.097] [2.945] [2.954] [3.079] [2.915] [3.086]
Loan 0.005 0.004 0.009** 0.009** 0.004 0.004 0.005
[1.258] [1.154] [2.386] [2.439] [1.144] [0.921] [1.259]
Deposit 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006
[0.941] [1.282] [1.163] [1.417] [1.271] [0.993] [1.164]
Leverage 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038***
[2.990] [3.572] [4.189] [4.643] [3.522] [3.452] [3.402]
Public -0.573** -0.557** -0.758*** -0.748*** -0.549** -0.550** -0.555**
[2.267] [2.223] [3.363] [3.353] [2.177] [2.206] [2.225]
Problembank -0.442 -0.510* -0.847*** -0.894*** -0.507* -0.477* -0.512*
[1.614] [1.791] [4.085] [3.878] [1.791] [1.740] [1.801]
Observations 8,697 8,697 6,745 6,745 8,697 8,684 8,684
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17
Table 6
Robustness - Countries with enough observations over period 1995-2006
Home and host characteristics Distance 
The table shows how different home and host characteristics and different measures of distance impact the performance of foreign banks in
developing countries. The dependent variable is profit before taxes divided by assets. Own is a dummy which is one if the bank is foreign
owned. Developing is a dummy which is one if the parent of the foreign bank is located in a developing country. Comp_host is the Panzar
Rosse (1987) H -statistics of the host country of the foreign bank as calculated by Claessens and Laeven (2004). Samereg is a dummy which is
one if home and host country are located in the same region. Comlang is dummy which is one if home and host country share the same
language. Instfam is a dummy which is one if home and host country are institutionally similar. Share is the ratio of the bank's assets to total
assets of the country's banking sector. Loan captures the ratio of loans to assets of the bank. Deposits equals deposits as percentage of the
bank's assets and leverage equals equity as percentage of assets. Public is a dummy which is one if a bank is majority owned by the
government. Problembank is a dummy which is one if the foreign bank exited the market within four years after entering. The sample period
is 1995-2006. All regressions are estimated using weighted OLS where the weights are equal to the inverse of number of banks active in the
country in a given year. Regressions include a constant and country-year fixed effects. The robust t-statistics allowing for clustering at the
country level appear in brackets and ***, ** and * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance respectively.
Combined Same region
Common 
language
Institutional 
familiar Combined Same region
Common 
language
Institutional 
familiar
Own 1.692 0.379 0.376 0.464 3.270** 0.491** 0.264 0.351
[0.896] [0.578] [0.546] [0.700] [2.237] [2.095] [1.079] [1.191]
Own*developing -0.222 -1.993 -0.845** -0.556 -1.372*** -2.865*** -1.253*** -1.470***
[0.374] [1.345] [2.148] [1.135] [5.357] [3.058] [2.738] [3.289]
Own*comp_host -3.380 -4.188*
[1.237] [1.785]
Own*samereg 1.628 2.107**
[0.965] [2.203]
Own*comlang 0.267 0.900**
[0.586] [2.439]
Own*instfam -0.149 0.608
[0.272] [1.620]
Share 0.050*** 0.030* 0.028* 0.028* 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.035***
[4.690] [1.997] [1.922] [1.943] [3.583] [3.144] [3.105] [3.290]
Loan 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.011** 0.010** 0.009** 0.010**
[0.677] [1.056] [0.899] [1.031] [2.319] [2.381] [2.197] [2.441]
Deposit 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.012* 0.009 0.012*
[1.318] [0.471] [0.216] [0.772] [1.251] [1.867] [1.438] [1.794]
Leverage 0.052** 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.058*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.046***
[2.393] [0.887] [0.989] [1.034] [4.175] [3.412] [3.384] [3.592]
Public -1.424 0.256 -0.013 -0.015 -0.427** -0.368** -0.385** -0.391**
[0.965] [0.261] [0.019] [0.020] [2.165] [2.025] [2.189] [2.106]
Problembank -1.880*** -1.649*** -1.514** -1.572***
[3.451] [2.858] [2.650] [2.715]
Observations 1,097 1,842 1,829 1,842 4,382 6,081 6,074 6,081
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.17 0.27 0.28 0.27
Table 7
New versus old foreign banks
New banks Old banks
The table shows how different home and host characteristics and different measures of distance impact the performance of foreign banks in
developing countries splitting the sample in two groups: old and new banks. New banks are domestic and foreign banks that have been active in
the country 12 years or less. Old banks are domestic and foreign banks that have been active in the country for more than 12 years. The dependent
variable is profit before taxes divided by assets. Own is a dummy which is one if the bank is foreign owned. Developing is a dummy which is
one if the parent of the foreign bank is located in a developing country. Comp_host is the Panzar Rosse (1987) H -statistics of the host country of
the foreign bank as calculated by Claessens and Laeven (2004). Samereg is a dummy which is one if home and host country are located in the
same region. Comlang is dummy which is one if home and host country share the same language. Instfam is a dummy which is one if home and
host country are institutionally similar. Share is the ratio of the bank's assets to total assets of the country's banking sector. Loan captures the
ratio of loans to assets of the bank. Deposits  equals deposits as percentage of the bank's assets and leverage  equals equity as percentage of assets. 
Public is a dummy which is one if a bank is majority owned by the government. Problembank is a dummy which is one if the foreign bank
exited the market within four years after entering. The sample period is 1999-2006. All regressions are estimated using weighted OLS where the
weights are equal to the inverse of number of banks active in the country in a given year. Regressions include a constant and country-year fixed
effects. The robust t-statistics allowing for clustering at the country level appear in brackets and ***, ** and * correspond to one, five and ten
percent level of significance respectively.
Registering 
property Legal rights Credit information
Investor 
protection
Enforcement 
contracts
Own 0.404 0.294 0.256 0.390* 0.332
[1.641] [1.383] [1.146] [1.956] [1.586]
Own*businessfam -0.236 0.104 0.163 -0.261 -0.080
[1.051] [0.479] [0.584] [1.044] [0.287]
Own*developing -0.709** -0.819** -0.688** -0.735** -0.738**
[2.418] [2.592] [2.463] [2.259] [2.424]
Share 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 0.027** 0.027**
[2.172] [2.140] [2.133] [2.138] [2.135]
Loan 0.008* 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007
[1.698] [1.544] [1.653] [1.597] [1.621]
Deposit 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006
[1.085] [1.210] [1.110] [1.190] [1.129]
Leverage 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035***
[3.172] [3.214] [3.129] [3.201] [3.172]
Public -0.326* -0.313* -0.318* -0.323* -0.327*
[1.760] [1.704] [1.747] [1.713] [1.765]
Problembank -1.305* -1.320* -1.327* -1.316* -1.328*
[1.784] [1.841] [1.850] [1.785] [1.806]
Observations 7,373 7,385 7,367 7,385 7,371
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22
Impact of foreign ownership on profitability - Distance in doing business
Table 8
The table shows how different measures of insitutional distance impact the performance of foreign banks in developing countries. Based on
the doing business indicators five different institutional distance measures are examined. The first colum tests whether institutional distance
with respect to the cost of registering property matters for the performance of a foreign bank. The second column looks at distance with
respect to legal rights. The third at the distance with respect to credit information. The fourth looks at investor protection and the last column
tests for the impact of differences in the cost of enforcing contracts. The dependent variable is profit before taxes divided by assets. Own is a 
dummy which is one if the bank is foreign owned. Businessfam is a dummy which is one if the difference between host and home country in
the specific dimension of doing business is below the median difference and zero otherwise. Developing is a dummy which is one if the
parent of the foreign bank is located in a developing country. Share is the ratio of the bank's assets to total assets of the country's banking
sector. Loan captures the ratio of loans to assets of the bank. Deposits equals deposits as percentage of the bank's assets and leverage  equals 
equity as percentage of assets. Public is a dummy which is one if a bank is majority owned by the government. Problembank is a dummy
which is one if the foreign bank exited the market within four years after entering. The sample period is 1995-2006. All regressions are
estimated using weighted OLS where the weights are equal to the inverse of number of banks active in the country in a given year.
Regressions include a constant and country-year fixed effects. The robust t-statistics allowing for clustering at the country level appear in
brackets and ***, ** and * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance respectively.
Definition Source
Banklevel
Profitabality
Own
Share
Loan
Leverage Bankscope
Deposit Bankscope
Public
Problembank
Home and host characteristics
Gdpcap
Comp
Findev
Distance 
Samereg
Comlang CIA World Factbook (2005)
Instfam
Businessfam
Dummy which is one if home and host country share the
same region, zero otherwise.  
World Bank 
Dummy which is one if home and host country share 
World Development Indicators
Panzar Rosse (1987) H-statistic as calculated by
Claessens and Laeven (2004). 
Claessens and Laeven (2004)
M2 divided by GDP in the host country International Financial Statistics
Total deposits and short-term funding divided by total
assets of the bank.
Dummy which is one if the bank is for 50 percent or
more owned by the government, zero otherwise. 
Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2007)
Dummy which is one if the bank exited the market within
4 years after entry, zero otherwise. 
Claessens, Van Horen, Gurganlar
and Mercado (2008)
Variable
Total loans divided by total assets of the bank. Bankscope
Total equity divided by total assets of the bank.
Appendix - Variable Definitions and Sources
Size of the bank. Assets of the bank divided by total
assets in the banking system of the country.
Dummy capturing whether home and host country are
institutional distant or not. First the absolute difference
between the quality of institutions of source and host
countries, based on the simple average of the absolute
difference of each of the six governance indicators, is
calculated. When the difference is below the median
difference the dummy has a value 1 if it is above it has a 
Profit before tax divided by total assets Bankscope
Claessens, Van Horen, Gurgarlan
and Mercado (2008)
Dummy which is one if 50 percent or more of the shares
of the bank are owned by foreigners, zero otherwise. 
Bankscope
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2008). 
GDP per capita in current international $ in host or home
country.
Same as instfam but difference in quality of five doing
business indicators (cost of registering property, legal
rights index, credit information, investor protection
index, cost of enforcing contracts.  
Doing business indicators
